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Abstract 
Qualitative and infinitesimal probability 
schemes are consistent with the axioms of 
probability theory, but avoid the need for 
precise numerical probabilities. Using 
qualitative probabilities could substantially 
reduce the effort for knowledge engineering and 
improve the robustness of results. We examine 
experimentally how well infinitesimal 
probabilities (the kappa-calculus of Goldszmidt 
and Pearl) perform a diagnostic task -
troubleshooting a car that will not start - by 
comparison with a conventional numerical belief 
network. We found the infinitesimal scheme to 
be as good as the numerical scheme in 
identifying the true fault. The performance of 
the infinitesimal scheme worsens significantly 
for prior fault probabilities greater than 0.03. 
These results suggest that infinitesimal 
probability methods may be of substantial 
practical value for machine diagnosis with small 
prior fault probabilities. 
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1 BACKGROUND AND GOALS 
Bayesian and decision theoretic methods have long 
been criticized for an excessive need for quantification. 
They require many numerical probabilities and 
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utilities that are difficult to assess and are liable to 
judgmental biases. Some people claim that since 
human thinking is inherently qualitative, it is 
incompatible with quantitative schemes. These 
criticisms have fueled interest in alternative 
formalisms for reasoning and decision making under 
uncertainty that are intended to be easier to use and 
more compatible with human cognition. Among these 
alternative schemes are: various generalizations of 
decision theory [Edwards, 1992]; Dempster-Shafer 
belief functions [Shafer, 1976];generalizations of logic, 
including default and non-monotonic logics [Ginsberg, 
1987]; fuzzy logic [Zadeh, 1983]; possibility theory 
[Dubois and Prade, 1988]; and fuzzy probabilities. 
If, however, our goal is simply to provide a qualitative 
basis for reasoning and decision making under 
uncertainty, there is no need to abandon Bayesian 
decision theory. The axioms of decision theory, 
indeed, assume only the ability to make qualitative 
judgments - that is, to order events by probability or 
outcomes by desirability. The quantification of 
probabilities and utilities can be based on purely 
qualitative judgments. Furthermore, several schemes 
have been developed that are purely qualitative, but 
are consistent with the axioms of decision theory. 
One such scheme is qualitative probabilities, originated 
by Wellman [1990; Henrion & Druzdzel 1991; 
Wellman & Henrion, 1993]. A second approach to 
qualitative probabilities is the kappa-calculus 
[Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1992], which represents all 
probabilities in a Bayesian belief network by e'K, where 
K is an integral power of E. The K -calculus is 
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consistent with the axioms of probability where E---+0. 
Events are ranked according to K. Events with larger K 
are assumed to be negligible relative to events with 
smaller K. The calculus provides a plausible set of 
events: those with the smallest (most probable) 
consistent with the observed findings. The calculus is 
sometimes called qualitative probability. To avoid 
confusion with other qualitative probability schemes, 
we call this representation infinitesimal probabilities. 
Pearl [1993] has extended this scheme to handle 
qualitative utilities to support decision making. 
The K-calculus or infinitesimal probabilities can be 
looked at in two ways: (a) as providing a scheme for 
non-monotonic reasoning whose semantics are firmly 
grounded in probability and decision theory; or (b) as 
providing a simplification of belief networks with 
numerical probabilities. In this paper, we are focus on 
the second view, and examine the performance of 
infinitesimal probabilities as an approximation to 
numerical probabilities. From this perspective, 
proponents of infinitesimal probabilities may claim 
four possible advantages over traditional numerical 
belief networks: 
1. It may be easier to express beliefs by partitioning 
events into a small number of sets of relative 
plausibility, that is values, than by assigning 
each event a precise numerical probabilities. 
2. Results from reasoning with infinitesimal 
probabilities are more robust and therefore more 
trustworthy since they are based on less specific 
inputs. 
3. Reasoning with infinitesimal probabilities is 
easier to understand and explain. 
4. Inference methods with infinitesimal probabilities 
can be computationally more efficient. 
Hitherto, these claims have been largely untested. 
Initial analysis of the computational complexity of 
reasoning infinitesimal probabilities Darwiche [1992] 
suggests that, in general, it is of the same order as 
reasoning with numerical probabilities, that is NP­
hard [Cooper, 1990]. There may be modest 
computational savings from doing arithmetic with 
small integers instead of floating point numbers. 
Most research on qualitative probabilities has 
concentrated on developing the formalisms and 
efficient algorithms. There has been little concerted 
effort to demonstrate their application to real tasks and 
to evaluate their practicality. Initial studies of QPNs 
[Henrion and Druzdzel, 1990; Druzdzel and Henrion, 
1993; Druzdzel, 1993] suggest that they are often 
inconclusive for nontrivial cases. For example, QPNs 
give vacuous results in any case with conflicting 
evidence. Studies of qualitative simulation have found 
similar difficulties. Much current research on 
qualitative simulation is directed towards integrating 
quantitative information to resolve ambiguities (and 
the resultant combinatorial explosions of the search 
space). 
In this paper, we report the results of an initial 
experimental study comparing the diagnostic 
performance on a specific belief network using (1) the 
K -calculus or infinitesimal probabilities, and (2) 
numerical probabilities. Our goal is to examine how 
well the infinitesimal scheme performs as an 
approximation to the numerical representation. We 
start with a fully assessed numerical representation, 
convert this into a kappa-representation using finite e 
values, and perform inference on a set of test cases. 
We first explain the mappings we used to obtain 
infinitesimal or K-values from the numerical 
probabilities, and how we mapped back from the 
posterior K-values into probabilities for comparison of 
performance. Then, we describe the experimental 
design, including the sample network, the set of test 
cases, and our variations of the prior fault 
probabilities, the epsilon values used in mapping, and 
the number of findings observations per case. The 
infinitesimal scheme provides a set of the most 
plausible diagnoses for each case. In the results, we 
compare these plausible sets with the posterior 
probabilities for the diagnoses produced by the 
numerical scheme. Finally, we discuss the 
implications of these results for the application of the 
K-calculus as a practical representation. 
2 MAPPINGS BETWEEN NUMERICAL 
AND INFINITESIMAL 
PROBABILITIES 
In order to be able to apply the K -calculus to 
probabilistic reasoning on a belief network with finite 
probabilities, we need to provide a mapping from 
probabilities into kappa values. In order to compare 
the results we need to map the kappa results back 
again into probabilities. Strictly, the K-calculus is only 
valid as E---tO. We use an approximation for finite 
values of E. For a finite E, the K-calculus partitions the 
real interval [0,1] into regions identified by integers, 
based on the smallest power of in the polynomial. This 
mapping is illustrated in Figure 1. 
More specifically, consider the real [0,1] interval I, 
which is the interval used by probability theory, and a 
discretized representation of I, which we call 5. 5 is a 
set of non-negative integers which the -calculus uses to 
represent probability measures in the interval I. We 
wish to explore the mappings f: I---tS (i.e., from 
numerical to infinitesimal probability) and g: S ---t I 
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(i.e., from infinitesimal to numerical probability). 
Note that there is information loss in the mapping f, 
since it is not injective. Moreover, the mapping g is 
not surjective. 
Definition 1 [ K"-map] [Spohn 1988] The mapping f 
from probability measures to K"-values takes a 
probability 1r and a threshold probability e and 
outputs a K" -value K" e S such that 
Figure 1 shows an example of a mapping for £ = 0.1. 
Kappa 
1C(X) 
3 
0 
0 0.001 0.01 0.1 
Prd:lability p(X) 
Figure 1: An example mapping giving kappa as a 
function of probability, for £=0.1. 
3 APPLICATION DOMAIN: WHY YOUR 
CAR DOES NOT START 
The task is to troubleshoot why a car is not starting, 
given evidence on the status of the lights, battery, fuel, 
fan belt, and so on. Figure 2 shows the Bayesian belief 
network displaying the causal and conditional 
independence relations. We are grateful to David 
Heckerman for providing the original belief network 
and to Paul Dagum for lending us his expertise as a 
car mechanic in adjusting some of the probabilities. 
All variables are binary (present or absent), except for 
battery charge which has three values (high, low, 
none). The initial network contains fully quantified, 
numerical conditional probability distributions for 
each influence and prior probabilities for each fault 
(source variable). Effects of multiple causes of a 
common effect are combined with noisy-ORs, 
generalized where necessary. 
There are nine explicitly identified faults in this model: 
spark plugs bad 
distributor bad 
fuel line bad 
fuel pump bad 
gas tank empty 
starter bad 
battery bad 
fan belt loose 
alternator bad 
Figure 2: Bayesian network representing the car diagnosis domain. Leak events represent all the 
potential causes of a fault other than those shown explicitly. The number in each origin fault of a leak 
node represents its prior probability in the original network. The numbers attached to each influence 
arrow represent causal strengths -that is the probability that the successor is broken given that the 
predecessor is broken, and all other predecessors are normal. 
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We also identified three leaks. Each leak event 
represents all possible causes of an event that are not 
explicitly identified above. The probability of a leak is 
the probability that its associated effect will be 
observed even though none of its identified causes are 
present. 
engine start other 
engine tum over other 
charging system other 
The leaky noisy or model assigns a probability to each 
leak, to handle the fact that the network is inevitably 
incomplete. In our adjusted network, the probability 
of each leak was substantially smaller than the sum of 
the probabilities of the identified causes for each event. 
There are 10 observable findings in the model_ listed 
here in non-decreasing order of expense to test: 
1. engine-start 
2. gas-gauge 
3. engine-tum-over 
4. lights 
5. radio 
6. fan-belt 
7. battery-age 
8. distributor 
9. spark-plugs 
10. alternator 
Note that there are four findings that are also 
enumerated faults, namely fan belt, alternator, spark 
plugs, and distributor. 
4 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We wish to investigate the effects of three factors on 
the diagnostic performance of infinitesimal 
probabilities: 
(a) The choice of the value of E on the mapping 
between numerical and infinitesimal probabilities. 
(b) The range of prior fault probabilities 
(c) The quantity of evidence in the test cases. 
We have already discussed factor (a). Here, we will 
discuss our choice of each of these factors, and the 
conduct of the experiment. 
4.1 Range of prior fault probabilities 
The numbers in Figure 2 are the original prior fault 
probabilities. To examine the effect of the magnitude 
of the priors on the relative performance of the 
infinitesimal calculus, we created versions of the 
network with larger probabilities. To do this, we 
multiplied the prior odds by an odds factor ranging 
from 10 to 1000. Table 1 shows the mean and range of 
the resulting prior odds we used. 
Table 1: The minimum, mean, and maximum prior 
fault probabilities. The top line shows the original 
probabilities. Those below are derived by multiplying 
the odds of each prior by the odds factor and 
converting back to probabilities. 
Odds Minimum Mean Maximum 
factor 
1 0.00001 0.00036 0.00100 
10 0.00010 0.00361 0.00991 
50 0.00051 0.01750 0.04766 
100 0.00103 0.03376 0.09099 
300 0.00307 0.08900 0.23095 
1000 0. 01017 0.21364 0.50025 
4.2 Test Cases and quantity of evidence 
We expected that the performance of both numerical 
and infinitesimal schemes would improve as a 
function of the quantity of evidence. We also wished 
to examine the effect of the quantity of evidence on the 
relative performance of the two schemes. 
Accordingly, we needed a representative set of test 
cases with varying numbers of findings. 
We generated a set of 116 test cases, in the following 
manner: For each of twelve faults (nine identified 
faults plus three leaks), we identified the most likely 
(modal) value for each of the ten observable findings. 
For each fault, we created a base case consisting of all 
findings at their modal value. In four cases, the fault is 
itself a finding, which we omitted from the base test 
case, since including the true fault as observed in the 
test case would be trivial. We then generated a second 
case for each fault by omitting the most expensive 
observation from the base case. Further cases were 
generated by omitting the next most expensive 
observation in tum. In all cases, we retained the 
finding that the engine does not start. In this way, we 
created a series of ten cases for eight faults, and nine 
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cases for the four faults that are observable, resulting 
in a total of 116 test cases in all. 
4.3 Computation 
To obtain results for the numerical probabilistic 
scheme, we employed IDEAL [Srinivas and Breese, 
1990], using the clustering algorithm from the IDEAL 
library. We applied each of the 116 test cases to the 
network using each of the six sets of priors, 
performing a total of 696 run. For each run we 
computed the posterior probability for each of the 
twelve faults resulting in 8352 probabilities. 
We also converted the original numerical probabilities 
into K-values, using the three values e (0.1, 0.01, 0.001), 
resulting in a total of 2088 additional runs. We ran 
each case using CNETS, a full implementation of the K­
calculus developed at the Rockwell Palo Alto 
Laboratory [Darwiche, 1994], producing posterior K­
values for each fault. For each run, we computed the 
plausible set, that is the subset of faults with the 
minimal K value. 
Definition 2 [Plausible Set] Consider a set 
V:;;{v1,v2, • • •  ,vm}representing m possible hypotheses, 
in which each hypothesis has been assigned a ](­
value. Let vmin =minvj by the minimum ](-value. 
J 
The plausible set is given by 
Cll(V)={j:vj =vminl· 
To compare the infinitesimal scheme with the 
numerical one, we converted K-values of diagnoses 
back to probabilities as follows: 
De fi n it ion 3: [Probability score] For a 
setV={v1,v2, ... ,vm}representing m p o s s i b  1 e 
hypotheses, in which each hypothesis has been 
assigned a ](-value, the corresponding probability 
distribution is given by 
ifvj=vmax 
otherwise 
(3) 
That is, the probability ni= 1/n is assigned to the true 
faults if it is in the plausible set of size n. Otherwise, 
we assigned p = 0. 
As an additional test, we also ran IDEAL using the 
exact algorithm, but using fault probabilities mapped 
to O.OlK for the values obtained from the mapping 
using the full set of K values. We applied this to a 
subset of 72 test cases. In the results, the plausible 
faults are clearly identifiable, having probabilities at 
least an order of magnitude greater than those of all 
other faults. We found that this approach, as expected, 
gave very similar results to the exact IC-calculus 
inference using CNETS . 
5 RESULTS 
Our first goal was to examine the effect of E values on 
the performance of the infinitesimal probability 
scheme. We then selected the value of E that gave the 
best results and examined the effect of varying the 
quantity of evidence on the performance of both 
numerical and infinitesimal schemes. 
5.1 Effect of E values 
Since the kappa calculus is only strictly correct as E---+0, 
we might expect it to perform better for small£, where 
the approximation will be mere exact. On the other 
hand, a larger E provides rnore partitions to the 
probability interval (0, 1], as shown in Figure 1, and 
consequently, it provides a finer discretization of the 
original probabilities, with less information lost. 
Accordingly, we might expect it to do better with 
larger e. To investigate this we analyzed an initial set 
of 72 test cases using E values of 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 
0.2. Figure 3 shows a graph of average probability 
score assigned to the true diagnosis for these cases, 
against e. It is interested to note that the average score 
is identical for E = 0.01 and E = 0.001, and also 
identical fore= 0.1 and e = 0.2. Overall, there is an 
improvement in performance with increasing E up to 
0.2. Accordingly, we selected E = 0.1 for use in our 
remaining experiments. 
., 0.3 " ., .. "' 
!- "' 0.25 
.. .. 0 -< I> 0.2 ., ..... s:: .. � � 0.15 
.. .... a: "' 
.. " 0.1 
r;,. ... 
� " 0.05 
�"' 
0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1 
Figure 3: Effect of E o n the score (probability 
assigned to the true fault) by the infinitesimal scheme 
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5.2 Effect of Number of Findings on the 
Plausible set 
As the quantity of evidence increases, we should 
expect the performance of both numerical and 
infinitesimal schemes to improve. Accordingly, we 
classified the cases by the number of findings. Figure 4 
graphs the average size of the plausible set (number of 
plausible faults) identified by the infinitesimal scheme 
as a function of the number of findings. These results 
summarize all116 cases fore = 0.1. As expected, the 
average size of the plausible set of faults decreases 
with the number of findings, from 7 faults with 1 
finding to 1. 21 faults for 10 findings. With 10 findings, 
this scheme provides almost complete specificity that 
is, the plausible set usually consists of just a single 
diagnosis. 
.. 10 ., 
Ill 
., ... 
.Ill ... 
Ill 
:I 
" ... 
liloo 
.. 
0 
., 
N 5 ... 
"' 
o+-----�------�-----r-----,----� 
0 2 6 8 10 
Number of fi nd i ngs 
Figure 4: The average size of the plausible set 
as a function of the number of findings in each 
case. 
5.3 Comparing the performance of 
infinitesimal and numerical schemes 
Next, we compare how the number of findings affects 
the diagnostic performance for the infinitesimal and 
numerical schemes. Figure 5 graphs the performance 
in terms of the average probability each assigns to the 
true fault, as a function of the number of findings. For 
both schemes, as expected, the average probability 
assigned to the true fault increases with increasing 
evidence, from about 0.15 with 1 finding, to about 0. 47 
with 10 findings. 
...., 0.5 '; 1:1 ... 
Gl 
:I I. ..., 
.. 
Cl 
.= 
e 
Cl,. 
0.25 
o �-----------------------------
0 2 4 6 8 10 
Number of findings 
Figure 5: The probability assigned to the true 
fault for each scheme as a function of number of 
findings 
What is, perhaps, surpnsmg is how closely the 
performance of the infinitesimal scheme tracks the 
performance of the numerical scheme. Indeed the 
infinitesimal scheme appears to perform better than 
the numerical scheme for intermediate numbers of 
findings, but this difference is not significant. Since 
the infinitesimal representation is derived from the 
numerical one, we could not expect it to do better, on 
average. 
Note that, even with all ten findings, both schemes 
average about 0.5 probability for the true diagnosis. 
This relatively poor performance arises because of the 
limited scope of the network, which does not provide 
the means to differentiate among several classes of 
fault. 
5.3 The magnitude of priors and the 
performance of infinitesimal 
probabilities 
The infinitesimal probability scheme appears to 
perform very well relative to numerical probabilities 
for the original car network, in which the prior fault 
probabilities are very small, on average 0.00036 To 
examine if it performs equally well for larger priors, 
we multiplied the prior odds by five odds factors, as 
shown in Table 1. Figure 6 shows the average 
probability assigned to the true diagnosis as a function 
of the average priors. Interestingly, the two schemes 
are almost indistinguishable up to an average fault 
prior 0. 033. Above that, the performance of the 
infinitesimal probability drops off sharply - that is, 
for average priors of 0.089 and 0.214. These results 
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confirm our expectation that infinitesimal works well 
for small priors, but not so well for large priors. 
.. -= Cl 
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� = 
... 
.. 
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c 
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c 
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a. 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1-
o+-----�------�--+-��-----
o.oo01 o.oo1 0.01 0.1 1 
Aver age prior fault probability 
Figure 6: Comparison of the average performance of 
infinitesimal and numerical probability schemes as a 
function of prior fault probabilities. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
We find these initial results very encouraging in terms 
of the diagnostic performance of the infinitesimal 
probability scheme. For this example domain, we 
found the best performance occurs using E = 0.1 to 0.2. 
Performance for E = 0.01 was slightly worse. 
Performance of the infinitesimal scheme relative to the 
numerical scheme does not appear to vary 
significantly with the quantity of evidence. The 
performance using infinitesimal probability is not 
noticeably worse than the numerical probabilities for 
prior fault probabilities up to about 0.03. For larger 
average fault probabilities, the relative performance of 
infinitesimal probabilities starts to drop off sharply. 
This findings suggests that infinitesimal probabilities 
are more likely to be reliable for diagnosis tasks with 
very small prior fault probabilities, such as most 
machine and electronic devices. They may also work 
for some medical domains, as long as the disease 
priors are less than 1%. 
The mapping from K-values back to probabilities that 
we have used is very simple. More sophisticated 
mappings are possible, making use of higher values. 
We should also point out that the scoring methods that 
we have used to evaluate performance have been 
based on posterior probability of the true diagnosis, 
which is perhaps the most exacting way to compare 
them. Another way would be to compare the rank 
ordering of diagnosis. A third, would be to evaluate 
the quality of decisions based on the diagnosis. In 
general, scoring rules based on ranks of diagnosis or, 
even more, the quality of decisions will be less rather 
than more sensitive to these differences in 
representation. 
While these findings are encouraging for the practical 
usefulness of infinitesimal probabilities, we should 
remember that these initial results are on a single 
domain. This car model domain is simple, with few 
loops and short chains. This kind of experiment 
should be conducted on a wide range of types of 
network to see how far these initial results will hold 
up. 
In the introduction, we distinguished view (a) of 
infinitesimal probabilities, as an approach to 
nonmonotonic reasoning, from view (b), as an 
approximation to numerical probabilities. We 
reiterate that this paper, we focus on (b), and we are 
not attempting to evaluate its use as an approach to 
nonmonotonic logic. Conclusions about the former 
have limited relevance to the latter. 
Infinitesimal probabilities are quite appealing as an 
alternative to numerical probabilities. They should be 
significantly easier to elicit from experts. Inference 
may be more effjcient. And resulting inferences should 
be somewhat more robust to changes in probabilities. 
Some questions that need further investigation 
include: 
Does the best choice of E vary with the domain? 
Does these results hold for larger networks, with 
more complex structures? 
Can this infinitesimal approximation be extended 
to utilities and decision making? 
Can we obtain a clearer analytic characterization 
of when performance will be or won't be 
reliable? 
In addition, we need practical knowledge 
engineering methods for eliciting infinitesimal 
probabilities. We anticipate that, in the long run, the 
best practical tools will combine qualitative and 
quantitative methods. 
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